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Court-Ordered Compulsory 




How should society protect itself from the risk of serious offences committed by 
persons with severe mental illness, and who are considered criminally insane? This 
question includes several difficult issues, among them the division of responsibility 
between two major sectors of society. As criminals they are the responsibility of the 
justice sector, whereas as patients they are the health sector’s responsibility. In such 
cases, the issue of crime prevention offers challenges for the justice sector. Mental-
ly ill criminals who are considered criminally insane cannot be held criminally re-
sponsible and subjected to punishment. This means that the justice sector cannot 
use imprisonment to protect against the risk that these persons commit new serious 
crimes. Society’s need for protection against future crime must be sought by other 
means than punishment. This can be done in primarily two ways. The justice sector 
can establish its own secure psychiatric institutions, i.e., a kind of ‘criminal justice 
hospital’; alternatively, crime protection can be left to the health sector’s regular psy-
chiatric health care institutions, in which case the health sector is attributed the role 
of an agent within the criminal justice system.
The Parliament in Norway has chosen the latter solution.1 As we will return to, 
criminally insane offenders can be subjected to a special criminal sanction that is not 
1 The Criminal Asylum in Trondheim was an exception.  Between 1895 and 1961, the Ministry 
of Justice had the decision-making authority for confinements and expulsions for this asylum, 
see Dahl and Thomassen (2015), ‘Om sikring og farlighetserklæringer – sikkerhetspsykiatrien 
etableres’, Tidsskrift for strafferett, p. 42.
* Legal advisor at SIFER South-East, national competence network for security, prisons, and 
forensic psychiatry.
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punishment and that consists in committal to compulsory psychiatric care. Although 
this is a type of criminal sanction, the responsibility for carrying it out rests on the 
regular psychiatric health care institutions. A question arises: is the health sector 
willing to take the role of an agent within the criminal justice system? Or more spe-
cifically: is the health sector willing to prioritise crime protection before health care? 
The Norwegian Parliament was in doubt about this, and so granted the prosecution 
authority a control function.
As a part of the Special Sanction Reform in 1997, the prosecution authority be-
came the health sector’s control body during the implementation of court-ordered 
compulsory psychiatric care.2 Their legal instrument is the right to appeal specific 
decisions concerning crime protection. The core of the control function is to super-
vise the psychiatric health care system in terms of its responsibility for protection 
against future crimes. This article is about the control function. More specifically, the 
aim of this article is to explain the background of the control function and investi-
gate specific issues related to the legislation.
In the following, the relevant rules will be given a brief presentation in section 
2. The background of the control function is explained in section 3, while section 4 
deals with the core of the control function: the legal regulation of the right to appeal. 
Section 5 rounds off with some concluding reflections about the control function. 
2. The Relevant Rules in Brief 
2.1 A Special Penal Sanction: Court-Ordered Compulsory Psychiatric Care 
Court-ordered compulsory psychiatric care is not regarded as punishment, but as a 
special penal sanction with a specific purpose: to protect society against criminal-
ity. On the basis of section 62 in the Norwegian Penal Code 2005,3 the court may 
sentence a criminally insane offender to compulsory psychiatric treatment in cases 
where there is a risk of new serious crimes. This special penal sanction was enact-
ed in 1997,4 implemented in 2002, and was introduced as a supplement to the civil 
system for compulsory psychiatric treatment based on the Mental Health Act 1999.5 
Though both forms of compulsory psychiatric treatment have crime prevention as 
their purpose, they differ significantly in how they are established, implemented and 
terminated. In the following, the focus will be on the implementation of the special 
2 LOV-1997-01-17-11 om endringer i straffeloven m.v., see also recommendations made in NOU 
1990:5, p. 97.
3 LOV-2005-05-20-28 om straff.
4 See footnote 2. 




The implementation of court-ordered psychiatric treatment is regulated in the 
Mental Health Act, and shares several provisions with the civil system for compulsory 
psychiatric treatment (section 5–1, first paragraph). The characteristics of court-or-
dered psychiatric treatment during implementation are regulated in section 5 of the 
Mental Health Act. Two distinctive features are to be highlighted here. According 
to the Mental Health Act section 5–3, second paragraph, the responsible physician 
or psychologist should pay consideration to both crime prevention and treatment, 
with particular emphasis on crime prevention. This is where the purpose of the spe-
cial penal sanction is expressed. According to the Mental Health Act section 5–4, 
the prosecution authority has the right to appeal specific decisions concerning crime 
prevention. This is where the core of the prosecution authority’s control function is 
expressed. 
2.2 The Control Function
If we look more closely at the right of appeal described in section 5–4 in the Men-
tal Health Act, the right of appeal relates to decisions on transfer. More specifical-
ly, decisions on the transfer of patients to and from fulltime stay at an institution, 
and decisions on the transfer of patients between fulltime stays at different institu-
tions. This means that the right of appeal is linked to the change between inpatient 
and outpatient care, and the change of inpatient care at one institution to another. 
According to section 4–10, first paragraph, transfer between different departments 
within the same institution is excluded from the right of appeal.
Besides the prosecution authorities, other parties entitled to appeal are the con-
victed person, and his or her closest relatives (section 5–4, second paragraph). Ap-
peals on transfer decisions (and most other decisions subject to the right of appeal) 
are judged by a supervisory commission, led by a lawyer, and consisting of a doctor 
and two other persons. Among the latter two, at least one should have experience 
as a patient or as a patient’s relative.  Every institution within the mental health care 
service is linked to a supervisory commission. 
According to section 5–5, the prosecution authority may also request a change 
in the execution of the sentence. Such petitions appear to be of little importance in 
practice, and were not investigated by the group that evaluated court-ordered com-
6 Concerning the terms for establishing court-ordered compulsory psychiatric care, see 
Mindestrømmen (2019), ‘Impending Danger: The Meaning of Danger as a Legal Requirement 
for Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment in the Norwegian Criminal Justice System’, Bergen Journal 
of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 7(1) 2019, pp. 110-135
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pulsory psychiatric care in 2008.7
Following a legislative amendment in 2019, the responsible physician or psychol-
ogist is required to consult the prosecution authority before the convicted person is 
transferred between different security levels within the same institution or is granted 
leave, if special considerations warrant it.8 The duty of consultation includes only 
changes which are of importance to the protection of society.9 
In the next section, we will examine the background of the prosecutor’s control 
function in order to better understand the purpose of the function.
3. The Development of the Control Function
3.1 The Division of Responsibility
In section one, it emerged that Norway has placed the responsibility for dealing with 
offenders with serious mental illness on the health sector’s regular psychiatric health 
care institutions. In this section, we will take a closer look at the reasons for Nor-
way’s current legislation.
An adequate place to begin is the Mental Health Act of 1848.10 The Mental Health 
Act was based on an idea of asylums as medical institutions for persons with se-
vere mental illness, led by medical staff.11 One of the consequences of this idea was 
that asylums were protected from becoming a detention place for criminals. In line 
with this, section 20 of the Mental Health Act stated that insane patients must not 
be kept with criminals. The doctors themselves would decide who should be asylum 
patients and determine the duration of their stay. As such, the doctors together with 
the asylum’s supervisory commission were sovereign in the decision on who should 
be admitted to the asylum and who should be discharged.12 This system, called asy-
lum sovereignty, met with criticism. Even though the justice sector had, for a period, 
its own secure psychiatric institution, it was clear—from the justice sectors point of 
view—that asylum sovereignty opened up the potential for the health services to re-
7 Report from an investigating group appointed by the Ministry of Justice and the Police, 18 May 
2006 (Etterkontroll av reglene om strafferettslig utilregnelighet, strafferettslige særreaksjoner og 
forvaring), found at: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/maland-utvalgets-rapport/
id509546/ (Last accessed 9th September 2019).
8 The Mental Health Act, third paragraph in section 5–3, see LOV-2019-06-21-48 om endringer i 
straffeloven og straffeprosessloven mv. (skyldevne, samfunnsvern og sakkyndighet). 
9 Prop. 154 L (2016-2017), p. 160.
10 Lov om Sindssyges Behandling og Forpleining (Sinnssykeloven) 1848. 
11 Skålevåg (2016), Utilregnelighet - En historie om rett og medisin, p. 67.
12 NOU 1983: 5, p. 6. See also sections 9 and 12 of the Mental Health Act 1848.
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fuse to take responsibility for offenders with severe mental illnesses.13
The Ministry of Justice initiated work towards a law reform in 1957.14 It would 
take decades of public investigations and resistance from the health sector before the 
legislative amendment finally came into place. As late as 1992, the Supreme Court 
noted that it was ‘highly unsatisfactory’ that the courts must accept people with se-
vere mental illness being placed in jail instead of in hospital.15 The Supreme Court’s 
dissatisfaction clearly referred to the hospitals’ legal right to decide which patients 
they would be taking care of, i.e., asylum sovereignty. The justice sector finally ad-
dressed the system of asylum sovereignty with the Special Sanction Reform in 1997. 
The majority in the Parliamentary Justice Committee agreed that a restriction of asy-
lum sovereignty was necessary to prevent patients from being subjected to ‘back and 
forth’ relocations between institutions.16 The reform included court-ordered compul-
sory psychiatric care, and with it a duty for the mental health service to take respon-
sibility for the convicted patients. The reform also included a new control function 
for the prosecutor, which we shall look into in section 3.2. 
3.2 The Background of the Prosecutor’s Control Function
A new control function for the prosecutor was mentioned already in the first propos-
al for a special sanction reform, in the Criminal Board’s review in 1974.17 The board 
proposed a special sanction—institutionalisation—for ‘the most dangerous group of 
criminally insane offenders’.18 The proposal was based on a duty for the health ser-
vice to take responsibility for these convicted persons, with the addendum that the 
prosecution authority should be given the opportunity to pronounce a statement be-
fore discharge from the institution was ultimately decided by doctors. The purpose 
of the prosecutor’s right to make a statement was to emphasise that crime prevention 
is particularly important.19 The proposal for this new special sanction met strong re-
sistance from the mental health care system and did not lead to legislative change.20 
The justice sector’s next review came in 1983.21 The Criminal Law Commission 
maintained the Criminal Board’s proposal for a new special sanction. The proposed 
right for the prosecution authority to make a statement was also maintained. The 
13 See footnote 1.
14 NOU 1974: 17, p. 8.
15 Rt. 1992 p. 577.
16 Innst. O. nr. 34 (1996-1997), p. 13.
17 NOU 1974: 17.
18 Idem, p. 113.
19 Idem, p. 156.
20 Ot. prop. nr. 87 (1994-1994), p. 10.  
21 NOU 1983: 57
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Commission believed that this would safeguard ‘public interests’ before discharge 
from an institution.22 The Criminal Law Commission’s proposal met the same resis-
tance from the health service as the previous Criminal Board’s proposal had done.23 
In line with the idea of asylums as medical institutions led by a medical staff, the 
health sector’s counter-argument was that compulsory psychiatric treatment should 
only be established on medical grounds, and should not be ruled by a court as a re-
sult of a criminal offence, and on the grounds of society’s need for protection against 
dangerous offenders.24 
The justice sector’s third attempt for a legislative reform came with the 1990 
NOU committee.25 The committee’s mandate was characterised by the will to find 
a compromise that was acceptable both for the justice sector and the health sector.26 
They addressed a central question: Did the health sector lack the will or the ability to 
take responsibility for protecting society from the risk of serious crime committed by 
criminals with severe mental illness? If there was a lack of ability, legal reform in the 
civil system for compulsory psychiatric treatment was a relevant instrument. If there 
was a lack of will, a statutory duty to take responsibility was a relevant legal instru-
ment. The committee found that authority granted to the health sector in the Mental 
Health Act was sufficient in itself, the problem was ‘significant restrictions’ when it 
came to the application of the law, i.e., there was a lack of will to use civil compulsory 
psychiatric treatment in order to protect society.27  The civil compulsory psychiatric 
treatment legislation had to be supplemented with a criminal law form of compul-
sory psychiatric treatment.28 The committee proposed a criminal law basis for the 
courts to sentence insane offenders to compulsory psychological health protection, 
with crime prevention as the primary purpose.29 
Still, the committee seems to have had doubts about the mental health care sys-
tem’s willingness to protect society. The prosecutor’s right to pronounce a statement 
was not enough to ensure the protection of society. The committee strengthened the 
prosecutor’s legal instrument from a right to pronounce a statement, to a right to ap-
peal against specific decisions made by mental health care authorities on the grounds 
of crime prevention. The committee had incorporated administrative law’s procedur-
al rules in the implementation of court-ordered compulsory psychiatric care.30 Ac-
22 NOU 1983: 57, p. 202.
23 NOU 1990: 5, p. 68.
24 Ibid.
25 NOU 1990:5, often referred to as the special sanction committee.
26 Ot. prp. nr. 87 (1993-1994), p. 10.
27 NOU 1990: 5, p. 72.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 LOV-1967-02-10 Lov om behandlingsmåten i forvaltningssaker (forvaltningsloven), chapter 
IV–VI. See also NOU 1990:5, p. 93.
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cording to the committee’s opinion, some decisions were ‘particularly intrusive both 
for the convicted, and for the society’.31 These decisions were pointed out as subject 
to appeal. 
Which of the mental healthcare system’s decisions were considered ‘particularly 
intrusive’, and therefore subject to appeal? Immediately there are three factors that 
seem relevant:  considerations for the patients, considerations of crime prevention, 
and the need to maintain an efficient treatment regime. Due to efficiency consider-
ations, it was found that most daily treatment decisions should not be subject to ap-
peal.32 When it came to more significant decisions that should be eligible for appeal, 
the committee did not distinguish between considerations for the patients and con-
siderations of crime prevention, even if these two considerations are unequal. They 
pointed out as eligible for appeal decisions on the transfer of patients to and from 
fulltime stay at institutions, and decisions on the transfer of patients between full-
time stays at different institutions. The patient and the patient’s closest relatives were 
granted a right of appeal on behalf of the patient, and the prosecution was granted 
a right of appeal on behalf of society.33 Parliament followed up the proposal, and the 
prosecutor’s control function was established. The right to appeal was also made ap-
plicable to patients subjected to civil  psychiatric  treatment.34  
After a few years of implementation, actual practice of this right to appeal was 
found to have unfortunate consequences for the operation of the mental health insti-
tutions. The reason was that patients could not be transferred before the deadline for 
appeals was out, or the complaint case was resolved. Meanwhile, pending a decision, 
much needed treatment places could be left vacant and unused.35 This is why the 
right to appeal today does not include transfer between different types of fulltime 
stay within the same institution.36
In conclusion, both the need for a criminal law form of compulsory psychiatric 
treatment and the need for a control function must be seen in light of the lack of 
confidence in the mental health care system’s willingness to take on responsibility for 
crime prevention. 
4. The Content and Limits of the Control Function 
In the previous section we saw that the Special Sanction Committee pointed out de-
31 NOU 1990: 5, p. 96.
32 Ibid.
33 Idem, p. 97. The patient’s closest relatives were given the right to appeal, because the patients 
were assumed often not to ‘be able to safeguard their own interests’.
34 Ot. prp. nr. 11 (1998-1999), p. 123, see also Mental Health Act 1999 section 4–10.
35 Ot. prp. nr. 65 (2005-2006), p. 81.
36 Mental Health Act 1999, section 4–10.
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cisions that are ‘particularly intrusive both for the convicted, and for the society’ as 
subject to appeal. But the consideration of the patient’s interests and the consider-
ation for prevention of crime are not necessarily coinciding considerations. Let us 
take a closer look at these two considerations in this context.
When it comes to secure psychiatric institutions, the transfer of patients usually 
has two key characteristics. First, the transfer may involve changes in the security 
level, and second, the transfer may involve changes in geographical location. From 
a patient perspective, both changes may be considered intrusive. From a crime pre-
vention perspective, only security-level changes are relevant, and primarily changes 
that imply a reduction of security level. In the following, we will discuss the decisions 
subject to appeal primarily from a crime prevention perspective.
We will first look at transfers to and from fulltime stay at institutions. As mentioned 
in section 2.2, the right of appeal is linked to the change between inpatient and outpa-
tient psychiatric care, which ensures the prosecutor’s right to appeal decisions concern-
ing such transfers. Normally, transfers from fulltime stay to care without fulltime stay 
are relevant to the prosecution’s control function. Transfers to fulltime stay usually im-
ply enhanced criminal protection, and thus are not as relevant to the prosecution au-
thority’s control function. However, there may occur cases where the prosecutor does 
not consider the institution’s safety level on a fulltime stay basis to be satisfactory, and 
the main rule ensures the prosecutor’s right to appeal such decisions.  
We will now look at transfers between different fulltime stays. Such transfers can 
occur either as transfers between different institutions, or as internal transfers within 
an institution. The main rule ensures the prosecutor’s right to appeal decisions about 
transfer between different institutions, irrespective of whether the transfer involves 
a strengthened or reduced security level. The exception rule for transfers within the 
same institution deprives the prosecutor the possibility to appeal decisions concern-
ing internal transfers within an institution. The exception for such internal transfers 
raises questions about what is meant by the ‘same institution’.  The problem is brought 
about by the fact that during recent years a number of health institutions in different 
geographical locations have been merged into major organisational units.37 In its in-
terpretation of what is meant by the ‘same institution’, the Directorate of Health has 
placed a decisive emphasis on the patient perspective: 
‘Whether you have two different day care centers, or two departments within the same 
institution, must be assessed in concrete terms. The fact that the departments are part 
of one organisational unit is not decisive. The decisive factor must be the significance of 
the transfer for the patient in terms of breaking up from habitual surroundings, change 
of treatment environment, proximity to family, etc. A department may be regarded as a 
separate residential institution if it is geographically segregated or appears as an opera-
37 NOU 2016: 25, p. 63.
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tional independent unit, depending on the circumstances of the case .’38 
As the Directorate of Health emphasises, changes in geographic location is a relevant 
criterion from a patient perspective. In a crime prevention perspective, changes in 
security level normally will be more important than changes in geographic location 
within the same security level. The Directorate of Health’s interpretation does not 
seem to take into account that the interpretation does not only include civil com-
pulsory psychiatric treatment, but also includes court-ordered psychiatric treatment, 
where the mental healthcare service is required by law to prioritise crime prevention. 
The interpretation also illustrates that the consideration of crime prevention was not 
considered when the exception rule was introduced.39
The exception rule for internal transfers implies that a patient can be transferred 
from a closed fulltime stay department to an open fulltime stay department within 
the same institution, without the prosecution authority having the right to appeal 
these decisions. On the other hand, the main rule implies that the prosecution au-
thority has the right to appeal decisions where a patient is transferred between the 
same level of security at different institutions, and even where the patient is trans-
ferred to a more stringent level of security at another institution. From a crime 
prevention perspective, the main rule and its exception imply that the prosecution 
authority have the right to appeal transfers that normally are not of importance to 
public protection, and are deprived of the right to appeal in some transfers that are of 
importance to public protection.
Finally, we will look at a form of non-statutory transfer that raises specific ques-
tions for the prosecution authority’s control function. Gradual transfer from inpa-
tient to outpatient psychiatric care involves a form of trial period, both from the 
perspective of the institution and of the patient. Such gradual transfers ensure that 
the institutions are able to quickly and informally change back to fulltime stay if nec-
essary. Stays in the patient’s home, which will normally increase in length during a 
gradual transfer, are considered as a form of leave. In some cases, these leaves may 
be protracted. The reasons are partly that the institutions need time to evaluate if 
the patient is prepared for a life outside the institution, and partly that some patients 
may consider it an advantage, or more secure, to keep the formal status of a full-
time stay patient during this transitional phase. From a patient perspective, gradual 
transfers are problematic only if they are mandatory. If so, the patient is deprived 
38 Directorate of Health, Regulations for mental health care with comments (Helsedirektoratet, 
Psykisk helsevernforskriften med kommentarer), author’s translation of comment on section 12: 
‘Hvorvidt man har med to ulike døgninstitusjoner eller to avdelinger i samme institusjon å gjøre 
må vurderes konkret. Det at avdelingene inngår i én organisatorisk enhet er ikke avgjørende. Det 
avgjørende må være hvilken betydning overføring vil få for pasienten med hensyn til oppbrudd fra 
vante omgivelser, skifte av behandlingsmiljø, nærhet til familie mv. En avdeling vil etter forholdene 
kunne anses som en egen døgninstitusjon etter bestemmelsen her dersom den er geografisk atskilt 
eller fremtrer som en driftsmessig selvstendighet enhet.’
39 Ot. prp. nr. 65 (2005-2006), p. 82.
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the right to appeal until the transfer is formalised through a formal decision. From 
a crime prevention perspective, such gradual transfers mean, for the same reason, 
that the prosecution authority is deprived of the right to appeal until the transfer 
is formalised through a decision. These transfers which have ‘particularly intrusive’ 
impact for society, which justifies the prosecutor’s right to appeal, may have been in 
force for a long time before a formal decision is taken and the right to appeal arises. 
This issue was not problematised in the legislative process before a review com-
mittee considered it.40 In the public hearing that followed the review, central consul-
tation bodies within the health service took a new position: they argued for a closer 
cooperation with the prosecution authority. The Norwegian Medical Association ar-
gued for the need to consider extended appeals or a more active role for prosecution 
authorities.41 The Directorate of Health argued in favour of strengthening the pros-
ecutor’s role.42 The Ministry of Justice’s deliberations led to a bill proposing that the 
prosecutor should be consulted in decisions concerning internal transfers and leave, 
if the concern for crime prevention is justified.43 As mentioned in section 2.2, the bill 
was passed by the parliament in the summer of 2019.44 Although the amendment to 
the law means that the prosecution authority should be consulted in cases where the 
responsible physician or psychologist consider transfer from a closed fulltime stay 
department to an open fulltime stay department within the same institution, and in 
cases where leave challenges crime prevention, the prosecution authority still has no 
right of appeal if the decision goes against the prosecutor’s recommendation. 
4. Concluding Reflections 
This review shows that the prosecutor’s right to appeal does not include all decisions 
that fulfill one of the 1990 NOU committee’s criteria for complaints: the ‘particularly 
intrusive’ impact for society.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has assumed that the prosecution authority has 
a central role in reviewing significant changes during treatment. This ruling can be 
traced back to a circular from the Attorney General. Here it is stated that the pros-
ecution authority ‘shall be notified of significant changes’, and in this regard have a 
right to appeal.45 The courts, with the Supreme Court in the lead, adopted this inter-
pretation of the prosecutor’s role. A number of judgements, concerning the choice 
between civil psychiatric treatment and court-ordered  psychiatric  treatment, are 
40 NOU 2014:10, p. 363.
41 Prop. 154 L (2016-2017), p. 156.
42 Idem, p. 157.
43 Idem, p. 160.
44 LOV-2019-06-21-48
45 Attorney Generals circular nr. 4/2001.
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based on the consideration that the prosecutor maintains a central role,  i.e. have a 
right to appeal, with regard to significant changes in treatment.46 This means that 
there is a marked discrepancy between the prosecutor’s regulated right of appeal and 
the courts’ perception of this right of appeal. Moreover, this discrepancy implies that 
there is reason to ask whether the courts actually has based the choice of sanction on 
a correct understanding of the prosecutor’s control function.
At the same time, there is also reason to question the suitability of the prosecu-
tion authority as a control body. The legislative proposals show no discussion of the 
suitability of prosecutors, and this factor instead seems to be taken for granted. In the 
proposal for the 2019 law amendment, the Ministry of Justice emphasises the prose-
cution authority’s experience: 
‘Social security and criminal protection are usually core tasks for the prosecution author-
ity, and prosecution authority are particularly experienced in assessing these matters.’47  
Two considerations give reason to further question the suitability of the prosecutors, 
despite their experience in assessing risk of violence. First, the implementation of 
psychiatric treatment involves a medical treatment regime, which the prosecutors do 
not have the adequate prerequisites for assessing. Secondly, and closely related to the 
first, forensic psychiatry has developed instruments for risk assessments that go be-
yond the prosecution’s experience-based assessments. The goal of modern violence 
risk assessments is described as follows: 
‘The main challenge of violence risk work is not to preach a “context-free” decision about 
who will and who will not be violent in an unspecified period of time.  Instead, the goal 
is to identify which management strategies are needed to minimise the individual’s risk 
of violence’.48  
The focus in psychiatric risk assessments has been changed from prediction to pre-
vention.  Against this background, a number of different risk instruments have been 
developed in forensic psychiatry, after the 1990 NOU committee gave the prosecu-
tion authority a control function. In psychiatric healthcare modern risk assessments 
have moved away from the dichotomy between dangerous or not dangerous.  In the 
justice sector, this dichotomy is still widespread.49 Their risk assessments still re-
flect the experience-based prediction that the 1990 NOU committee has built the 
46 Rt. 2002, p. 990, repeated in Rt. 2005, p. 1091, Rt. 2011, p. 385, etc.
47 Prop. 154 L (2016-2017), p. 160, author’s translation:  ‘Samfunnssikkerhet og samfunnsvern er 
normalt kjerneoppgaver for påtalemyndigheten, som myndigheten har en særlig erfaring med å 
vurdere.’
48 NOU 2010:3, p. 96, author’s translation: ‘Hovedutfordringen ved voldsrisikoarbeid er ikke å 
predikere en «kontekstfri» beslutning om hvem som kommer til og hvem som ikke kommer til å 
gjøre voldshandlinger i løpet av et på forhånd uspesifisert tidsrom. Målet blir i stedet å utrede hvilke 
håndteringsstrategier som er nødvendige for at den enkeltes voldsrisiko skal bli lavest mulig.’
49 See NOU 2014: 10, part 4.
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court-ordered psychiatric treatment upon, and which forensic psychiatry has left be-
hind. In such a light, the control body may prove to have less knowledge of risk as-
sessments than the body to be controlled. 
Both the lack of medical knowledge and modern violence risk assessments may 
indicate some caution on the part of the prosecutors when it comes to exercising the 
control function. Little is known about the number of complaints today, but a survey 
published in 2008 concluded that there were not many complaints about decisions 
on transfer, either from the prosecutors or the patients.50
Despite the prosecutor’s lack of both medical knowledge and modern violence 
risk assessment methods, there may still be reasons to maintain a control function 
for the prosecution authority. The Ministry of Justice, in its proposal for the 2019 law 
amendment, has emphasised the value of public confidence in the mental health care 
sector’s ability to protect society from the risk of violence.51 At the same time, the 
Ministry has pointed out that the prosecution’s control function should help to take 
account of ‘all aspects’ in the case.52 These diffuse ‘all aspects’ in the case might be the 
core of the control function. Although not all decisions that have ‘particularly intru-
sive’ impact for society are covered by the right of appeal, and even if the prosecutor 
does not have the prerequisites to be able to assess all decisions in the health service, 
and even though the right of appeal may hardly be used, the existence of a control 
function might satisfy a public sense of justice.  
50 See footnote 7. 
51 Prop. 154 L (2016-2017), p. 158.
52 Idem, p. 159.
